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NOTES
THE APPLICATION OF THE JOHN DOE SUMMONS
PROCEDURE TO THE DUAL-PURPOSE
INVESTIGATORY SUMMONS
INTRODUCTION
In 1975 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Bisceglia,' upheld
the authority of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to issue John Doe
administrative summonses for the purpose of obtaining information
from third parties regarding taxpayers whose identities are unknown.2
In response to this decision and to safeguard the taxpayer's privacy, 3
1. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
2. Id. at 150. The IRS began issuing John Doe summonses in the early 1970s.
See Jeopardy and Termination Assessments and Administrative Summonses: Hear-
ings on S. 1205 Before the Subcomm. on Administration of the Internal Revenue
Code of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1975) (statement of
Robert S. Fink, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Fink, Internal Revenue
Summons Power, 38 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n § 19.02[6], at 19-16 (1980). In Bisceglia,
upon notification from the Federal Reserve of the possibility of unpaid taxes, the IRS
sought the identity of an individual who had depositied 400 decrepit $100 bills in a
commercial bank within a few weeks. 420 U.S. at 142-43. The summons was not
incident to an ongoing investigation, but rather was the product of a hunch that such
an investigation might be warranted. Id. Upon receipt of the summons, the bank
officers refused to comply and the IRS brought an enforcement proceeding. Id. at
143-44. The Sixth Circuit determined that § 7602 of the Code did not authorize the
use of a John Doe summons that does not identify the person subject to investigation.
Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d 706, 712-13 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 141
(1975). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of § 7602 indicates a
broad IRS summons power that authorizes the IRS to issue such John Doe sum-
monses. 420 U.S. at 149-50. The Court stipulated, however, that § 7602 does not
authorize the IRS to conduct "fishing expeditions" into the private affairs of bank
depositors. Id. at 150-51.
3. United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983); In re The Tax
Liabilities of John Does, 671 F.2d 977, 979 (6th Cir. 1982); Fink, supra note 2,
§ 19.02[6], at 19-19; Wesley, Recent Developments Involving Administrative Sum-
monses, 1982 S. Ill. U.L.J. 41, 55, 57; see H.R. Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
306-07 [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep.], reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2897, 3202-03.
4. I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1976). The provision states:
Any summons described in subsection (c) which does not identify the person
with respect to whose liability the summons is issued may be served only
after a court proceeding in which the Secretary establishes that-
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascer-
tainable group or class of persons,
(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class
of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of any
internal revenue law, and
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Congress included section 7609(f) of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code)4 as part of the 1976 Tax Reform Act.5 This section requires the
Internal Revenue Service to obtain judicial approval before issuing a
John Doe summons by establishing that the summons relates to the
investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group of persons, 6
a reasonable basis for the investigation exists7 and the information
cannot practically be obtained from another source.8 Section 7609(f) is
not a separate summons power, 9 but rather is an additional require-
ment to a summons authorized under section 7602.10 Thus, any IRS
summons that does not identify the taxpayer under investigation must
receive court approval prior to issuance."
By requiring court approval for a John Doe summons, section
7609(f) limits the ability of the IRS to randomly examine the personal
(3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of the
records (and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose
liability the summons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.
Id.
5. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
6. I.R.C. § 7609(f)(i) (1976).
7. I.R.C. § 7609(f)(2) (1976).
8. I.R.C. § 7609(f)(3) (1976).
9. United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983); see I.R.C.
§ 7609(c), (f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The court in Thompson suggested that the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Barter Sys., 694 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1982), incor-
rectly interpreted § 7609(f) as a separate and distinct summons power. 701 F.2d at
1179 n.8. A careful examination of the Barter opinion, however, does not suggest
such an interpretation. See 694 F.2d at 168. Rather, Barter merely holds that
§ 7609(f) does not apply to a § 7602 summons when the summons names a taxpayer.
Id.
10. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1179 & n.8 (6th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 306 (3d Cir. 1981). Section
7602 of the Code empowers the IRS to discover all relevant and material information
necessary to further a legitimate investigation of a taxpayer. I.R.C. § 7602 (1976).
The "material and relevant" test of § 7602 does not question whether the information
sought will contradict the taxpayer's return, but "whether the inspection sought
'might ... [throw] light upon' the correctness of the taxpayer's returns." Foster v.
United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Siegel, 263
F.2d 530, 533 (2d Cir. 1959)), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959). The test does not
require an affirmative showing of probable cause. Id. at 186; Fink, supra note 2,
§ 19.02[2], at 19-6; Kenderdine, The Internal Revenue Service Summons to Produce
Documents-: Powers, Procedures, and Taxpayer Defenses, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 73, 77
(1979).
11. I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1976); see United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d
1345, 1346 (10th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 713 (1983); United
States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Oil & Gas
Producers Having Processing Agreements with Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F. Supp. 440,
441 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
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records of unknown taxpayers. 12 A dual-purpose summons that both
furthers an investigation of a named taxpayer and results in the inves-
tigation of an unknown taxpayer, however, may allow the IRS to
circumvent the requirements of section 7609(f) .13 For example, if the
IRS issues a summons to a barter exchange naming the exchange
partners as the subjects of the investigation, compliance with the
summons may subject unknown exchange members to investigation.
Because the summons names a taxpayer, it is unclear whether the IRS
must comply with section 7609(f). Section 7609(f) is the sole provision
safeguarding the unknown taxpayer's privacy from unnecessary gov-
ernmental intrusion. Thus, the ability of the IRS to circumvent the
provision through a dual-purpose summons could render the section
7609(f) safeguard ineffective.14
This Note addresses the issue whether the simultaneous investiga-
tion of a third-party recordkeeper and an unknown taxpayer excuses
the IRS from compliance with the John Doe summons procedure
provided in section 7609(f). Part I examines the statutory language
and legislative history of section 7609(f) and finds that Congress de-
signed the section to safeguard the privacy interests of the taxpayer,
while minimizing the administrative burden on the IRS. Part II con-
cludes that the John Doe summons proceeding must be followed
whenever the IRS clearly intends to investigate an unknown taxpayer
at the time of issuance of a summons to a known taxpayer.
I. INTERPRETING SECTION 7609(f) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A. Statutory Analysis of Section 7609(f)
Section 7609(f) applies to "any summons ... which does not iden-
tify the person with respect to whose liability the- summons is is-
sued."'15 Section 7609(f) does not specifically mention a dual-purpose
12. See In re Oil & Gas Producers Having Processing Agreements with Kerr-
McGee Corp., 500 F. Supp. 440, 443-44 (W.D. Okla. 1980); H.R. Rep., supra note
3, at 311, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 3207-08. In Kerr-
McGee, a John Doe summons that sought copies of all oil-processing agreements that
Kerr-McGee had entered into in a particular tax year failed because the IRS did not
establish the possibility of a tax deficiency resulting from these transactions. 500 F.
Supp. at 443. The court held that the John Doe summons in question was overbroad
and constituted an impermissible "fishing expedition" into the private affairs of
unknown individuals. Id. at 443-44.
13. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1179 n.8 (6th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Barter Sys., 694 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1982).
14. Id. An approach that excuses the IRS from complying with § 7609(f) in the
case of a dual-purpose summons because the summons names a taxpayer may permit
the IRS to abuse its investigative authority. The IRS could construe this approach to
grant carte blanche in issuing such a summons merely by naming a known record-
keeper as the institutional recipient of the summons.
15. I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1976).
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summons.' Moreover, the language of section 7609(f) is susceptible to
different interpretations.
By introducing the section with the word "any," Congress conceiv-
ably sought to include dual-purpose summonses that have a secondary
purpose of investigating unknown taxpayers, in order to prevent the
circumvention of the provision through the addition of a named tax-
payer to the summons. 17 Thus, when the institutional purpose of the
IRS is to investigate the tax liabilities of both the unknown taxpayer
and the third-party recordkeeper, the investigation of the unknown
taxpayer arguably should invoke application of section 7609(f).' 8
In addition, section 7609(a) requires the IRS to notify a known
party affected by a summons issued to a third-party recordkeeper.' 9
16. See id.
17. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983)
(literal language of section 7609(f) triggered whenever the IRS clearly intends at the
time of issuance of a summons to investigate an unknown taxpayer who will be
revealed through compliance); H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 307, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3203 (because notice to the targeted taxpayer is
impossible in the case of a John Doe summons, the IRS must receive court approval
prior to issuance of a summons which fails to name the targeted taxpayer); cf. United
States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 149 (1975) (phrase "any person" is not limited to a
person whose identity is known); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Winton, 131 F.2d
780, 782 (6th Cir. 1942) ("any" is one of whatever kind or quantity); Roedler v.
Vandalia Bus Lines, 281 Ill. App. 520, 523 (1935) (word "any" normally is construed
as equivalent of "every" or "all"); State v. Steenhoek, 182 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Iowa
1970) (in statutory language, "any" is synonymous with "every" and "all"); Shilbury
v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Misc. 2d 979, 982, 284 N.Y.S.2d 124, 129 (1967) (in
statutory language, "any" means no limitation).
18. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983).
19. I.R.C. § 7609(a) (1976); Fink, supra note 2, § 19.05, at 19-42. The right to
notice to which the taxpayer is entitled under § 7609 does not apply to a summons
issued to a third party that does not hold third-party recordkeeper status. Kummer,
Summonses! and the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 13 Wake Forest L. Rev. 773, 777 (1977).
The statutory definition of recordkeeper includes banks, savings and loan associa-
tions, credit unions, consumer reporting agencies, brokerage firms, attorneys and
accountants. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) (1976). Despite this broad language, proposed
regulations state that third-party recordkeeper status exists only when the records are
kept by the third party in its capacity as recordkeeper. 45 Fed. Reg. 55,765 (1980) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) (proposed Aug. 21, 1980). When dealing with
credit-card agencies, some courts have held that when the IRS summons business
records not involving a customer's use of a credit card, the third-party company does
not attain the status of third-party recordkeeper. United States v. Exxon, 450 F.
Supp. 472, 476-77 (D. Md. 1978); United States v. Connecticut Motor Club, 43
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-460, 79-462 (D. Conn. 1978). In United States v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-1128 (D. Nev. 1979), the court held that a
gambling casino's issuance of plastic cards that entitled customers to credit and to
negotiate personal checks gave the gambling casino third-party recordkeeper status.
Id. at 79-1129 to 79-1130. Likewise, in United States v. New York Telephone Co.,
644 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit held that the telephone company is a
third-party recordkeeper because it extends credit and issues credit cards to its
customers. Id. at 960. These cases reflect a growing conflict concerning the definition
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The known party has standing to intervene 20 and may have the court
stay the summons pending resolution of any objections. 2' Because
section 7609 protects the known taxpayer from infringement of his
privacy resulting from a third-party summons, the unknown taxpayer
arguably should be guaranteed an equivalent protection. 22
By contrast, reference to a single, unknown "person" in describing a
John Doe summons in the section 23 may permit the IRS to satisfy the
statutory requirements by naming one known taxpayer as the subject
of the investigation. 24 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Euge,25
held that, absent an express statutory prohibition or substantial coun-
tervailing policies, the summons power of the IRS should be broadly
construed. 26 Because section 7609(f) does not directly mention a dual-
purpose summons and such provisions are construed broadly, the IRS
may not need to obtain court approval prior to issuance. 27
Statutory language, however, generally does not differentiate be-
tween singular and plural word forms.28 This is particularly true
when the statutory language abstractly prescribes a general rule for
of a third-party recordkeeper and, consequently, the application of § 7609. See
generally Fink, supra note 2, § 19.05[1] (growing body of litigation as to who is
considered a third-party recordkeeper); Wesley, supra note 3, 51-52 (discussing
ambiguities in statutory definition of third-party recordkeeper).
An exception to the § 7609(a) notice requirement exists when the IRS has reason-
able cause to believe that giving notice may result in an attempt to conceal or destroy
the taxpayer's records. I.R.C. § 7609(g) (1976). In addition, § 7609(a) does not apply
when the IRS seeks to determine whether the business records of an identified
individual have been kept, id. § 7609(a)(4)(B), the identity of a person having an
account with the institution, id. § 7609(c)(2)(A), or the collection of tax from a
person against whom an assessment has been made, id. § 7609(c)(2)(B).
20. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(1) (1976).
21. Id. § 7609(b)(2).
22. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 1981); H.R. Rep., supra
note 3, at 307, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3203. See infra
notes 44-51 and acompanying text.
23. I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1976).
24. United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1983):
United States v. Gottlieb, 712 F.2d 1363, 1367-68 (l1th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Barter Sys., 694 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1982).
25. 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
26. Id. at 711; see, e.g., United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975)
(broad construction of the IRS's summons authority is required "absent unambiguous
directions from Congress"); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1971)
(limiting IRS's summons authority whenever a civil investigation may lead to a
criminal prosecution would "stultify enforcement of federal law"); United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1964) (stringent interpretation of the IRS's summons
authority "might seriously hamper" the Commissioner's investigatory power).
27. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28. See H. Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws
§ 76 (2d ed. 1911); F. McCaffrey, Statutory Construction § 20 (1953); 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.34 (4th ed. 1973).
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future application.29 If Congress had used the term "persons" in defin-
ing a John Doe summons, the IRS undoubtedly would not be excused
from fulfilling section 7609(f) merely by naming a single taxpayer
subject to an ongoing investigation. 30 Reference to a single unknown
"person," therefore, is a tenuous basis upon which to alter the applica-
tion of section 7609(f) .31 Because this ambiguity remains in the statu-
tory language, however, an analysis of the legislative purpose of sec-
tion 7609(f) is warranted.
B. Legislative History of Section 7609(f)
The legislative history of section 7609(f) indicates that the provision
faced little opposition in Congress and remained virtually intact as
drafted. 32 The Joint Committee on Taxation (Joint Committee) stated
that improvement of the administration of tax laws was a major goal
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.33 The Joint Committee stressed the
need for changes designed to strengthen taxpayer rights. 34 Further,
emphasis was placed on the need for effective court review in limiting
the ability of the IRS to issue administrative summonses. 35 The pas-
sage of section 7609(f) and the Joint Committee's emphasis on tax-
payer rights indicate that amendments aimed at taxpayer rights were
among the foremost congressional concerns in the 1976 Tax Reform
Act. 36
29. 2A C. Sands, supra note 28, § 47.34; see Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442
U.S. 653, 665 (1979) (change in statutory language from "Indian" to "Indians" does
not indicate a change in meaning); Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 91 (1945)
("buying rate" is not limited to a single rate); American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 697
F.2d 1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (in determining meaning of congressional acts,
words importing the singular may extend to the plural); 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("In
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, . . . words importing the singular
include and apply to several persons, parties, or things .. ").
30. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (6th Cir. 1983). But
see United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (criticizing
Thompson for interpreting the term "person" to include each person with respect to
whose liability the summons is issued).
31. Cf. American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 697 F.2d 1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(use of singular noun "vehicle" should not disqualify owner of several vehicles from
Motor Carrier Act exemption).
32. Compare H.R. 10,612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 764 (1975) (original House
version of provision) with Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat.
1520, 1701-02 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f) (1976)).
33. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explana-
tion of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 at 11 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in 1976-3
C.B. at 23 [hereinafter cited as Joint Comm. Explanation].
34. Id., reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 23.
35. Id. at 11-12, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 23-24.
36. See id., reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 23-24; H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 16,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2911.
5791984]
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Congress recognized that a John Doe summons is a necessary tool in
many legitimate IRS investigations. 37 At the same time, Congress
believed that the use of the John Doe summons should not infringe
unreasonably upon the privacy of the taxpayer.38 Congress therefore
adopted section 7609(f) as a means to prevent IRS "fishing expedi-
tions"39 when investigating unknown taxpayers.
During congressional hearings relating to the 1976 Tax Reform Act,
witnesses voiced concern over the use of jeopardy and termination
assessments and administrative summonses as harassment tactics
against political activists. 40 Testimony revealed that the emergence of
37. H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 307, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3203.
38. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3203.
39. See id. at 310-11, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3206-07.
The House Report stated that:
[I]t is important to preserve the John Doe summons as an investigative tool
which may be used in appropriate circumstances, [but] at the same time,
the committee does not intend that the John Doe summons is to be available
for purposes of enabling the Service to engage in a possible 'fishing expedi-
tion.'
Id. at 311, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3207.
40. See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 230-34 (statement of Hope Eastman,
Associate Director, ACLU); id. at 235-36 (statement of Jeff A. Schnepper, Rutgers
College). The history of politically motivated audits includes those aimed at the
Communist Party from 1954 to 1964, the Kennedy-Johnson extremist groups in 1961,
the Nixon "enemies" at various times during the Watergate era and Black Panther
Party members. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 230-34 (statement of Hope East-
man, Associate Director, ACLU); see Who's Snooping Into Your Tax Returns Now,
U.S. News & World Rep. 61, 61 (Aug. 11, 1975) (citing instances of congressional
and other governmental examination of tax returns for political purposes).
A termination assessment is an IRS procedure whereby the Commissioner may
determine prior to the expiration of the tax year or required date for filing that the
collection of tax from a specified taxpayer may be in jeopardy. Senate Hearings,
supra note 2, at 1 (statement of Sen. Floyd K. Haskell); Joint Comm. Explanation,
supra note 33, at 357-58, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 369-70; see I.R.C. § 6851
(1976). The IRS may then serve the taxpayer with a notice of termination of the tax
year and demand immediate payment upon penalty of seizure and possible sale of the
taxpayer's property. I.R.C. § 6851 (1976); Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note 33,
at 357-58, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 369-70. A jeopardy assessment is an IRS
procedure whereby the Commissioner determines that a deficiency in tax payment
exists and demands payment and levy on all property of the taxpayer so that collec-
tion of taxes will not be jeopardized by delay. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 2
(statement of Sen. Floyd K. Haskell); Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note 33, at
356-57, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 368-69; see I.R.C. § 6861 (1976). Unlike the
ordinary taxpayer, the taxpayer subject to a jeopardy assessment may be subject to
collection while his case is pending in court. See I.R.C. § 6861 (1976). Although the
IRS cannot sell the taxpayer's property under a jeopardy assessment, the taxpayer is
deprived of the beneficial use of the property. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 2
(statement of Sen. Floyd K. Haskell). Congress altered these procedures in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 by providing for expedited administrative and judicial review of
jeopardy and termination assessments. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
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the John Doe summons was part of a growing trend of IRS surveil-
lance of individuals, rather than an isolated instance of abuse of
authority. 41 This testimony suggests that the enactment of section
7609 was a response to issues of individual privacy raised by this
growth of administrative surveillance. 42 Under this view, the privacy
interests of the unknown taxpayer affected by a dual-purpose sum-
mons should be a primary concern in analyzing the need for a proce-
dural safeguard. 43
While Congress did not specifically debate the merits of section
7609(f), it did debate its companion measure 44 that requires the IRS to
notify a known taxpayer affected by a third-party summons of its
service and permits the known taxpayer to intervene in district
court.45 Opponents of this companion provision argued that such an
amendment would result in increased litigation involving administra-
tive summonses46 thereby "seriously jeopardizing the ability of the IRS
455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1695-97 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6851, 7429 (1976)); Joint
Comm. Explanation, supra note 33, at 359-64, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 371-76.
41. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 88 (statement of Robert S. Fink, Esq.).
42. See id.; United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983); In re The
Tax Liabilities of John Does, 671 F.2d 977, 979 (6th Cir. 1982); Fink, supra note 2,
§ 19.02[6], at 19-19.
43. See H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 307, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3203 (use of the third-party administrative summons should not infringe
on the privacy of the unknown taxpayer); Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note 33,
at 364-65, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 376-77 (same). As such, § 7609(f) could be
considered a remedial statute in that the provision was adopted to redress an area of
past abuse, and the provision faced virtually no opposition in Congress. See supra
notes 32-43 and accompanying text. A statute is considered remedial when it is
enacted by a majority in order to remedy some practice considered to be improper,
rather than when it is enacted-as a compromise between groups of legislators. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 800, 809 (1983); see 3 C. Sands, supra note 28, § 60.02, at 31 (remedial statute
facilitates "the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries"). A remedial statute
should be liberally construed to advance the prescribed remedy. International Nutri-
tion, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health, 676 F.2d 338, 341 (8th Cir. 1982);
Chewning v. Schlesinger, 471 F. Supp. 767, 774 (D.D.C. 1979); 3 C. Sands, supra
note 28, § 60.01.
44. See 122 Cong. Rec. 25,920-26 (1976) (discussing various amendments to
intervention requirement for known taxpayers).
45. I.R.C. § 7609(a)-(e), (g)-(h) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)-(e), (g)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) & 26 U.S.C.A. § 7609(h) (West Supp. 1983)). The notice-
and-intervention safeguard for a known taxpayer is set out in § 7609 and encompasses
a number of subsections. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
46. Letter from Rowland F. Kirks, Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to Hon. Russell B. Long (July 20, 1976), reprinted in 122 Cong.
Rec. 23,388 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kirks Letter]; Letter from Edward H. Levi,
Attorney General, to Hon. Russell B. Long (July 21, 1976), reprinted in 122 Cong.
Rec. 23,386 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Levi Letter]; see 122 Cong. Rec. 25,921
(1976) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
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to administer the revenue laws in cases of noncompliance." 47 One
government analyst stated that "[i]t is clear from the sheer magnitude
of this investigatory program that even if only a relatively small
proportion of the summonses results in new litigation, the impact
upon the federal judiciary will be staggering and could be crip-
pling." 48
Despite some government opposition, Congress adopted this com-
panion measure, recognizing that the burden imposed on the IRS was
not sufficient to outweigh the need for protecting the known taxpay-
er's privacy interest. 49 Similarly, Congress did not intend that the
burden on the IRS should thwart the privacy interests of the unknown
taxpayer .50 The legislative history states that when dealing with a
single-purpose summons served on a third-party recordkeeper, either
the notice-and-intervention safeguard for a known taxpayer or the
John Doe safeguard for an unknown taxpayer must be invoked.51
Thus, to conclude that Congress would want to exempt the unknown
taxpayer who is the subject of a dual-purpose summons from similar
protection is unreasonable. Because the notice-and-intervention safe-
guard is impractical, the IRS must comply with the John Doe admin-
istrative proceeding in the case of a dual-purpose summons.
Congress, however, did not intend to impose an undue burden on
the IRS in obtaining court authorization prior to the issuance of a
John Doe summons in enacting section 7609(f). 52 Proponents of the
provision acknowledged that in balancing the interests underlying
section 7609(f), protecting the privacy interests of the taxpayer might
frustrate the collection of taxes from tax evaders. 53 Congress nonethe-
less believed that section 7609(f) created a necessary balance between
47. Letter from William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, to Hon. Russell B.
Long (July 21, 1976), reprinted in 122 Cong. Rec. 23,386 (1976)
48. Kirks Letter, supra note 46, reprinted in 122 Cong. Rec. 23,388 (1976).
49. See H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 307, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3203; Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note 33, at 364-65, reprinted in
1976-3 C.B. at 376-77.
50. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 305 (3d Cir 1981); H.R. Rep., .supra
note 3, at 307, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3203.
51. H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 307, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3203 (privacy problems are resolved if the notice-and-intervention safeguard
or John Doe summons procedure is applied); Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note
33, at 365, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 377 (John Doe summons proceeding enacted
because notice requirement is impossible when unknown taxpayer is involved).
52. H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 311, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3207; Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note 33, at 370, reprinted in 1976-3
C.B. at 382.
53. 122 Cong. Rec. 25,922-23 (1976) (statements of Sens. Hruska & McClellan).
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the taxpayer's privacy and effective IRS investigation.5 4 If application
of a John Doe administrative proceeding to a dual-purpose summons
54. See United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1983);
H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 311, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3207: Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note 33, at 369-70, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B.
at 381-82.
55. In recent years, public concern has arisen regarding the effects of sophisti-
cated data-gathering activities by government organizations. A. Miller, The Dossier
Society, in Privacy, A Public Concern 102 (1975); see American Enter. Inst., Privacy
Protection Proposals 1 (1979); Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Cohf. on Advocacy
in the U.S., Privacy in a Free Society 28-29 (1974); D. Marchand, The Polities of
Privacy, Computers, and Criminal Justice Records 4-5 (1980). As a result of recent
advances in computer technology, one commentator has stated that "the same elec-
tronic sensors that can warn us of an impending heart attack might be used to locate
us, track our movements, and measure our emotions and thoughts." A. Miller, supra,
at 102. Government agencies gather an immense amount of information about
individuals both through self-reported individualized data and information obtained
from private sector recordkeepers. See id.; American Enter. Inst., supra, at 35. The
dramatic increase in the number of data banks has raised the fear of the advent of a
"dossier society." See American Enter. Inst., supra, at 1; A. Miller, supra, at 103.
Governmental abuse of tax returns and tax procedures heighten these concerns.
American Enter. Inst., supra, at 1.
Justice Douglas, in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), stated:
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to
surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from government ....
The dossiers on all citizens mount in number and increase in size ....
Taken individually, each step [of government intrusion] may be of little
consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society
* * * in which government may intrude into the secret regions of man's life
at will.
Id. at 341-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court also has acknowledged
that privacy encompasses not only an interest in making personal decisions without
interference, but also an interest in not disclosing personal information. Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (dictum).
In addition, Congress has recently enacted a series of laws to prevent unnecessary
governmental intrusion into the privacy of individuals. Freedman, The Right of
Privacy in the Age of Computer Data and Processing, 13 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1361,
1374-78 (1982). Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88
Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a-559 (1982)), in order to restrict
government disclosure of personal information to third parties. S. Rep. No. 1183,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6916, 6916-17 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; Note, Federal Legislative Pro-
posals- for the Protection of Privacy, 8 Fordham U.L.J. 773, 790 (1979-1980); see
Note, The Interest in Limiting the Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 139, 147 (1983). The Act generally prohibits a
federal agency from disclosing information about an individual to any person or
other agency without the individual's consent. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982). A govern-
ment agency is prohibited from disclosing any record which is contained in its data
banks without written consent of the individual affected by the disclosure except in
certain enumerated circumstances. Id. In 1978, Congress passed the Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act of 1978 which limits the federal government's access to individual
records held by banks and financial institutions. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697,
3697-710 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982)). Most recently,
1984]
584 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
undermines this balance, such a safeguard should not be applied. An
analysis of these policy considerations underlying section 7609(f) is
therefore necessary.
C. Balancing the Privacy Interest of the Taxpayer Against the
Administrative Burden on the IRS
In the realm of federal taxation, Congress must enact revenue laws
that guard against the individual's loss of privacy 5 and yet maintain
the efficiency of the IRS in curbing tax evasion. 56 The enactment of
section 7609 is an example of this balancing process. 57 A third-party
recordkeeper possesses a substantial amount of information regarding
its customers; a checking account alone may reveal substantial per-
sonal information about the account holder.58 To grant the IRS unlim-
ited access to personal information when dealing with third-party
recordkeepers, therefore, ignores the privacy interests of the taxpayer.
Recent judicial developments in the third-party summons area,
however, raise questions as to the future efficacy of these privacy
protections. 59 As a general rule, the IRS lacks the authority to issue a
summons solely for research purposes.6 0 Courts, however, have inter-
Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 which provides special protection
for the news media against search and seizure of news media materials. Pub. L. No.
96-440, 94 Stat. 1879, 1879-83 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (1982)).
Such legislation evinces a substantial acknowledgement of an individual's interest in
protecting against disclosure and dissemination of personal information. See, e.g., S.
Rep. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3950, 3950-52; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 9273, 9305; Senate Report, supra, at
1-2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6916, 6916-17.
56. See H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 310-12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3206-08; Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note 33, at 364-65, 369-70,
reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 376-77, 381-82; Kummer, supra note 19, at 800-01;
Wesley, supra note 3, at 47.
57. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
58. See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 225 (statement of Hope Eastman,
Associate Director, ACLU); id. at 86 (statement of Robert S. Fink, Esq.); Kirshner,
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978-The Congressional Response to United
States v. Miller: A Procedural Right to Challenge Government Access to Financial
Records, 13 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 10, 10-11 (1979-80).
59. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1179 n.8 (6th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Barter Sys., 694 F.2d 163, 168-69 (8th Cir. 1983).
60. United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 488 F.2d 953, 962-63 (5th Cir.
1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 943, aff'd on remand, 518 F.2d 747 (5th Cir.
1975) (per curiam). In Humble Oil, the IRS sought information about taxpayers who
had surrendered leases to a third-party company during the taxable year in question
and information concerning the amounts of any lease bonuses that had been paid. Id.
at 954. The court held that absent an investigation of a taxpayer the IRS lacks the
authority to issue a summons. Id. at 954, 962. As a result of Humble Oil, it is unlikely
that the IRS will ever again admit to the issuance of a John Doe summons purely for
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preted this rule to permit the issuance of a summons for research
purposes provided an ongoing, particularized investigation 'of a
known or unknown taxpayer also exists. 6 1 Because the IRS is not
bound by a probable cause requirement in issuing a summons,6 2 it is
likely that the use of these dual-purpose summonses will increase in
the future.6 3 As a result, the privacy safeguards in section 7609 should
be complied with in order to limit the "fishing expeditions" that
Congress sought to prevent.
The legislative history, however, reveals that Congress did not
intend to impose an undue burden on the IRS in enacting section
7609.4 Section 7609(f) establishes modest standards for the issuance of
a John Doe summons:6 5 The IRS must show that "a transaction has
occurred, and that the transaction . . . is of such a nature as to be
reasonably suggestive of the possibility that the correct tax liability
research purposes. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 90 (statement of Robert S. Fink,
Esq.)
61. E.g., United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 307-08 (3d Cir.
1981); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 635 F.2d 391, 395-96 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981); United States v. Flagg, 634 F.2d 1087, 1091-92 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981); United States v. Island Trade Exch., 535 F.
Supp. 993, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
62. See supra note 10.
63. More than 93 million individual returns were filed in 1980. 1980 Comm'r of
Internal Revenue Ann. Rep. 9. Because of this large number, the IRS uses the
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) and the Discriminant Func-
tion formula (DIF) to determine which returns should be audited. United States v.
Flagg, 634 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981);
Wesley, supra note 3, at 42. The DIF is a mathematical method that "assigns various
weights to selected items entered on a return." Wesley, supra note 3, at 42. The
returns are scored with the determination that those returns with the higher scores
have a greater potential for error. Id. The TCMP is a "random selection system
designed to measure and evaluate taxpayers' compliance characteristics." Id. TCMP
results are used as a data pool for the development of the DIF. Id. The TCMP "aids
the IRS in determining those areas of tax administration into which it should concen-
trate its limited enforcement resources." Flagg, 634 F.2d at 1089. The court in Flagg
upheld the authority of the IRS to compel taxpayer cooperation in TCMP audits. Id.
at 1092. Because the IRS is only bound by a relevance requirement and does not have
to establish probable cause to investigate a taxpayer, see supra note 10, the require-
ment that a summons relate to an ongoing investigation of a taxpayer is easily met.
See Kenderdine, supra note 10, at 76. This standard, therefore, provides no practical
check on the investigatory power of the IRS. See id. As a result, the IRS is likely to
increase its use of summonses primarily aimed at the collection of TCMP data.
64. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
65. United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1983); see
I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1976). Section 7609(h) vests jurisdiction in the district courts and
provides that the judge make the determination in an ex parte proceeding solely on
the petition and affidavits of the IRS. I.R.C. § 7609(h) (current version at 26
U.S.C.A. § 7609(h) (West Supp. 1983)).
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with respect to that transaction may not have been reported."' , As
such, the requirements for issuance of a John Doe summons under
section 7609(f) are merely a variation of the normal requirements for
the enforcement of any IRS summons.
6 7
Requiring a John Doe summons proceeding for all summonses di-
rected at known third-party recordkeepers because such information
might implicate unknown parties, however, could upset the balance
that Congress established in section 7609(f).68 Virtually any IRS sum-
mons may uncover information that could be used to identify and
investigate an unknown party. 69 The existence of an ongoing investi-
gation of a known taxpayer, therefore, arguably should excuse the IRS
from complying with section 7609(f), regardless of the existence of a
dual purpose.70 If the IRS had to comply with section 7609(f) for every
summons issued under section 7602, the "IRS would be shouldered
with significantly greater administrative burdens than Congress in-
tended."'71 Such a result would exacerbate the problem of swelling
civil caseloads in the federal district courts. 72 This would be especially
troublesome because section 7609(h) (3) generally requires an enforce-
ment proceeding under section 7609 to take precedence on the docket
over all other cases. 73 District courts could be forced to act as "review-
ing administrators for . . . those well-financed litigants whose pri-
mary tactic is to retard the judicial process, delay the determination of
their tax liability, and make litigation for the Government as expen-
sive as possible."7 4
66. H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 311, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3208.
67. Compare United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964) (holding that the
four elements of a prima facie showing by the IRS in an enforcement proceeding are:
that the investigation is conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose; the information
is relevant to that investigation; the information is not already in the Commissioner's
possession; and the other administrative steps required by the Code have been
followed) with I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1976) (providing that the John Doe summons must
relate to the investigation of a particular person or group, there is a reasonable basis
for the investigation and the information cannot be obtained from another viable
source).
68. United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 13 (2d Cir. 1983).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 13-14.
71. Id. at 13.
72. See Kirks Letter, supra note 46, reprinted in 122 Cong. Rec. 23,388 (1976)
(addressing problems of increased litigation, delayed disposition of civil cases and
increased burden on judicial resources likely to result from instituting administrative
summons safeguards).
73. I.R.C. § 7609(h)(3) (current version at 26 U.S.C.A. § 7609(h)(3) (West Supp.
1983)). A proceeding brought to enforce a summons under § 7609, however, will not
take precedence on the docket over cases the court considers more important. Id.
74. Levi Letter, supra note 46, reprinted in 122 Cong. Rec. 23,386 (1976).
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II. APPLYING SECTION 7609(f) TO THE "INTENDED" SECONDARY
INVESTIGATION: A RECOMMENDATION
A. The Clear-Intent Test
Neither a policy excusing the IRS from ever complying with the
John Doe summons proceeding in the case of a dual-purpose summons
that names a taxpayer subject to investigation nor a policy requiring
the IRS to comply with section 7609(f) for every dual-purpose sum-
mons appears to reflect the congressional intent underlying section
7609(f). 75 To excuse the IRS from complying with section 7609(f) in
the former situation would be to ignore the privacy interests of the
unknown taxpayer and to permit the IRS to conduct the "fishing
expeditions" that Congress sought to limit.76 To adopt the latter ap-
proach, however, would be to require a John Doe proceeding for
every IRS summons and thus severely hinder the administrative oper-
ations of the IRS. 77 In order to preserve a balance between the privacy
of the individual and the administrative burden on the IRS, a practi-
cal policy that protects the targeted, unknown taxpayer, and at the
same time, avoids an excessive administrative burden on the IRS must
be implemented.
The IRS, therefore, should follow the John Doe summons proceed-
ing whenever it clearly intends to investigate a taxpayer who will be
identified through a recordkeeper's compliance with a summons. 78 An
admission by the IRS that a summons issued to a third-party record-
keeper will likely result in the investigation of unknown parties would
certainly indicate such an intent.7 9 This determination, however,
75. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text. In United States v. Gottlieb,
712 F.2d 1363 (11th Cir. 1983), Judge Anderson suggested a third possible approach
which would permit the IRS to obtain the third-party records without satisfying the
requirements of section 7609(f), while limiting the use of the records against the
unknown taxpayer. Id. at 1368 n.13. Because this interpretation would hamper the
effective enforcement of tax laws and had no statutory mandate, the court discarded
it as unfeasible. Id.
76. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
78. This is the same analysis that the Sixth Circuit adopted in United States v.
Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1983). Thompson involved an IRS attempt to
summon the daily transaction sheets of a barter exchange. Id. at 1177. The IRS
asserted that the daily transaction sheets that cbntained the names of individual
exchange members were necessary to verify the information contained on other
exchange records. Id. The IRS agent testified that these transaction sheets would also
be used to identify barter members that the IRS wished to investigate. Id. The court
denied issuance of the summons, absent IRS compliance with the John Doe summons
proceeding, because of the clear intent of the IRS to investigate unknown taxpayers.
Id. at 1180-81.
79. See id. at 1178-79.
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should not rest solely upon the subjective intent of an individual agent
(as to whether the institutional purpose of the summons is the investi-
gation of the known or unknown taxpayer). Clear intent to investigate
exists whenever the subsequent investigation of an unknown taxpayer
is a motivating factor in the issuance of the summons.80 Objective
factors, such as the nature of the transaction underlying the investiga-
tion or established IRS policies labeling certain transactions or devices
as potentially indicative of tax deficiency, therefore, are relevant in
establishing clear intent."' For example, in a barter exchange setting
in which the summons names the exchange partners, the unique and
nontraditional features of the barter exchange may reveal a clear IRS
intent to investigate the barter exchange members upon revelation of
their identities. 2 Likewise, an established IRS policy labeling tax
shelters as indicative of tax deficiency may reveal a clear IRS intent to
investigate the clients of a holding company promoting tax shelters
upon identification through a summons that names the company as
the suspect party.8 3
The legislative history of section 7609 reveals that the main purpose
of the section was to give the targeted taxpayer notice of the third-
party summons so that he would be able to assert appropriate de-
fenses . 4 Because unknown taxpayers do not have the option of oppos-
ing a John Doe summons in an enforcement proceeding, judicial
supervision is the only viable alternative to protect an unknown tax-
payer's privacy interests. 5 A refusal to comply with section 7609(f)
80. Id. at 1181.
81. See id. (subjective factors alone are not adequate in determining intent).
82. See id. at 1175-77, 1181. A barter exchange acts as a clearinghouse for the
purchase of goods and services by exchange members. United States v. Gottlieb, 712
F.2d 1363, 1364 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1175-
76 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Barter Sys., 694 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 303-04 (8th Cir. 1982). In a
normal barter transaction, no cash changes hands. Gottlieb, 712 F.2d at 1364.
Exchange members purchase goods from one another and payment consists of credit-
ing and debiting the accounts of the respective members. Id. at 1364. The exchange
partners retain a percentage of each transaction as a fee. Id. Members of bartering
organizations must include the value of any trade credits received during the taxable
year in their gross income. Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100.
83. See United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1983). In
Tiffany Fine Arts, the IRS sought the client list of a holding company engaged in
promoting tax shelters. Id. at 8-9. The court held that the existence of an ongoing
investigation of the holding company excused the IRS from complying with § 7609(f)
despite a possible dual purpose to investigate the customers revealed through compli-
ance with the summons. Id. at 13-14. Under a clear-intent test, an established IRS
policy that labeled tax shelters as "suspect" might reveal a clear IRS intent to
investigate the customers of Tiffany and require the IRS to comply with § 7609(f).
84. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
85. H.R. Rep., supra note 3 at 307, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, at 3203; Joint Comm. Explanation, supra note 33, at 365, reprinted in 1976-3
C.B. at 377.
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merely because the recordkeeper is also the subject of an ongoing
investigation would be in direct contravention of the legislative in-
tent. 86 Moreover, opposition by the recordkeeper is not a viable check
because no guarantee exists to ensure that the recordkeeper and the
unknown taxpayer share the same interest in opposing the summons.87
The requirement of a John Doe summons proceeding when the IRS
clearly intends to investigate unknown taxpayers despite an ongoing
investigation of the recordkeeper is therefore crucial to preserve the
primary safeguards Congress established through enactment of section
7609.
Further, this interpretation satisfies the Supreme Court mandate in
Euge requiring a clear directive from Congress or substantial counter-
vailing policies to prevent a broad construction of the IRS summons
power."" In enacting section 7609, Congress directed that either a
notice-and-intervention safeguard for the known taxpayer or a John
Doe summons proceeding safeguard for the unknown taxpayer must
attach when the IRS issues a summons.8 9 Because the IRS may clearly
intend to investigate unknown taxpayers along with the named third-
party recordkeeper, the clear-intent test is an effective solution to
preserve the congressional directive announced through enactment of
this section.9 0
In addition, the requirement of a John Doe proceeding when a
clear IRS intent exists to investigate both a named and an unknown
taxpayer does not unduly burden the IRS.91 Under this test, section
7609(f) does not apply if such an established dual purpose does not
exist, 2 the IRS is not aware that such investigation of the record-
86. United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1179 n.8 (6th Cir. 1983). See
supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
87. See H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 307, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3203 (interest of third-party recordkeeper not subject to investigation is
far less pressing than that of taxpayer under investigation); Joint Comm. Explana-
tion, supra note 33, at 365, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 377 (third-party recordkeeper
not subject to investigation can challenge summons only for procedural defects).
Although the interest of a third-party recordkeeper in opposing the dual-purpose
summons may be similar to an unknown party's interest when the recordkeeper is
also subject to IRS investigation, the recordkeeper's interest is likely to be less urgent
when the institutional purpose of the summons is to investigate the unknown party
revealed through the recordkeeper's compliance. See H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at 307,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong & Ad. News at 3203; Joint Comm. Explanation,
supra note 33, at 365, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 377.
88. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980). See supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
90. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (6th Cir. 1983).
91. Id. at 1180.
92. Id.
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keeper will result in implicating third parties9 3 or a dual investigation
is only a remote possibility. 94 Further, a John Doe summons proceed-
ing would not apply to a summons directed at a known taxpayer with
the additional purpose of general research because such summons
lacks a clear intent to investigate unknown parties.9 Moreover, this
approach would not unduly burden the IRS because the standards in
section 7609(f) are modest. 96
B. Procedural Aspects of the Clear-Intent Test
Under this clear-intent test, if the IRS fails to comply with section
7609(f) in the case of a dual-purpose summons that has a secondary
purpose of investigating an unknown taxpayer, the named third-party
recordkeeper can validly refuse to surrender the information to the
IRS. 97 The IRS then must initiate an enforcement proceeding in order
to force the third-party recordkeeper to deliver the summoned infor-
mation. Because section 7609(f) is an additional requirement to a
summons issued under section 7602, rather than a separate summons
power, 98 proof of IRS intent should be included in the initial IRS
showing of compliance with requisite procedure.
In a section 7602 enforcement proceeding, the IRS must make a
prima facie showing that the summons was issued pursuant to a
legitimate purpose, 99 the information summoned is relevant to that
purpose, 00 the IRS has followed the proper procedure' and the
information sought is not in the government's possession. 02 Once the
IRS makes an initial showing of compliance with these requirements,
the burden rests with the taxpayer to challenge the summons and
93. Id.
94. id.
95. See id. at 1180. A clear IRS intent to investigate unknown taxpayers does not
include situations when only a remote possibility of such investigations exists. id. A
summons issued with the institutional purpose of general research would generally
seem to create only a remote possibility of further investigation of unknown parties.
96. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
97. A recipient of an IRS summons may refuse to comply with the summons
when the IRS has failed to follow the proper procedure. See United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). Because § 7609(f) is an additional requirement to a § 7602
summons, rather than a separate summons power, see supra notes 9-10 and accompa-
nying text, a third-party recordkeeper who receives a dual-purpose John Doe sum-
mons can validly refuse to comply with the summons when the IRS fails to follow the
required John Doe summons procedure.
98. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 58.
102. Id. at 57-58.
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convince the court that deficiencies exist.' 0 3 Because the existence of a
clear intent is determinative of the existence of a John Doe summons
under the proposed test, the IRS should be required to negate a clear
intent to investigate as part of this preliminary showing. 04 The bur-
den then should be on the named third-party recordkeeper seeking
enforcement of section 7609(f) to prove that a clear intent did in fact
exist.
CONCLUSION
Section 7609(f) can effectively safeguard the privacy interests of an
unknown taxpayer who is subject to an IRS investigation. In light of
the modest standards set forth in this section, interpreting section
7609(f) to include summonses that have a secondary intent of investi-
gating an unknown taxpayer does not place an undue burden on the
IRS. To preserve the balance established by Congress in enacting
section 7609(f), the IRS must comply with a John Doe proceeding
whenever it clearly intends to investigate a taxpayer whose identity
will be revealed through a recordkeeper's compliance with a sum-
mons.
Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey
103. United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1971).
104. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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